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Interfold

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Token Transparency Filing

B1 v1.4 · Filed 25 Aug 2026Complete

Project & Team

01

Description of Project

Provide a concise narrative that clearly states each of (a)–(e) below.

  • (a) Problem the project solves — The problem the project is solving.
  • (b) Operational priorities — Provide a high-level description of how the project expects to support ongoing development and operations over time.
  • (c) High-level project overview — How the project works at a high level.
  • (d) Primary token functions — The primary functions of the token (e.g. gov participation).
  • (e) Control surface reliance — If any, briefly describe the anticipated or possible evolution of the protocol's governance/control model.

(a) Problem the project solves

Many valuable computations require multiple independent parties to contribute sensitive data to produce a shared outcome. However, existing systems force a choice between three bad options: hand the data to a custodian, expose the data, or trust proprietary hardware. Each of which reintroduces a party that must be trusted.

The Interfold is distributed infrastructure for multiplayer privacy. It enables independent parties to utilize their encrypted data collaboratively. It turns multiple private inputs from different sources into verifiable computations. It does this all without data custody, data exposure, or trusted hardware.

(b) Operational priorities

On-going maintenance will performed by Gnosis Guild, the team that built and incubated the protocol. Gnosis Guild now acts as a development and maintenance service provider to The Interfold Foundation. Funds for development of the protocol were via Gnosis Guild, who raised a pre-seed, a seed, and a Legion round. Additionally, once The Interfold Foundation was incorporated, it received a grant from the Aragon foundation, as well as held two public sales in the form of Uniswap continuous clearing auctions.

(c) High-level project overview

Confidential computation is delivered through ephemeral Encrypted Execution Environments (E3s).

An E3 works like a sealed room that assembles itself for one job and dissolves afterwards. Participants encrypt their inputs before submitting them, so nothing sensitive is ever handed to a third party. The key needed to open those inputs is split across a committee of independent operators called ciphernodes, meaning no single participant can decrypt anything on its own.

The computation runs directly on the encrypted data, and only the agreed result is revealed. Alongside the result, the E3 produces a cryptographic proof that the computation was carried out correctly, which is publicly verifiable on Ethereum Mainnet.

The stack is open source at github.com/theinterfold, documented at docs.theinterfold.com, with technical write-ups at blog.theinterfold.com.

(d) Primary token functions

  1. Bond collateral - Ciphernode operators must post FOLD as bond collateral to operate a Ciphernode.
  2. Operator rewards and slashing - Ciphernodes earn FOLD for completing network operational activities and can be slashed for misbehavior.
  3. Governance - FOLD is required to participate in The Interfold governance.

(e) Control surface reliance

On chain governance for FOLD token holders runs on an Aragon OSx DAO contract with two voting modes.

  1. Public voting with the Aragon token-voting plugin
  2. Private voting with CRISP (coercion resistant impartial selection protocol) plugin (secret-voting plugin for short)

Initially all proposals will require The Interfold Foundation's approval before being executed. However, this will be moved to veto shortly thereafter and will eventually be removed.

02

Known Project Team

For each existing entity: Labs/DevCo (e.g., Founder, CEO, CTO, COO), Foundation (e.g., President, Executive Director, CFO, COO), and DAO / onchain governance leadership (if applicable) list the:

  • (a) full names,
  • (b) official titles,
  • (c) and prior experience of key team members.

For any non-existent entity, explicitly mention it does not exist. External links may be included but they will not factor into the score.

Labs / DevCo

Full Name

Official Title

Prior Experience

Auryn Macmillan

Founder, Gnosis Guild

Gnosis, Clr.fund, DAOhub, Colony

Foundation

Full Name

Official Title

Prior Experience

Samuel Jacques-Cloutier

Director, The Interfold Foundation

Hash Directors, Ministry of Financial Services – Cayman Islands Government

DAO / Onchain Governance

Full Name

Official Title

Prior Experience

The Interfold DAO is currently being set up at https://app.aragon.org/dao/ethereum-mainnet/interfold.dao.eth/dashboard

03

DAO Structure

Provide a structured description of the DAO's governance, powers, and economic rights. If a DAO does not exist, state so for each sub question. Even if there is no DAO, there must be an answer to (d). Address the lettered items below.

  • (a) IP ownership & control — State what IP the DAO owns or controls (e.g., codebases/repos, trademarks/brands). Note any license if relevant.
  • (b) Contract/admin powers — List on-chain or administrative authorities and limits: pause/upgrade roles (e.g., multisig pause), governance-executor authorities, and the method of authority for each (e.g., veto, majority, super-majority).
  • (c) Locked-token rights (conditional) — If locking/staking for additional rights exists, explain the additional rights and what tokenholders can and cannot decide. If no locking mechanism exists, leave absent.
  • (d) Current tokenholder governance rights and economic arrangements — If any, describe the current governance rights of tokenholders and any presently operative rights or arrangements relating to treasury actions, fee-routing, rewards, buybacks, or other protocol-controlled resources. If none, state that explicitly.
  • (e) Control surface reliance — If any, briefly describe the anticipated or possible evolution of the protocol's governance/control model.
  • (f) Dissolution authority — State who can dissolve/wind up the DAO and by what mechanism (e.g., on-chain vote threshold, board resolution of a legal wrapper).

(a) IP ownership & control

The Interfold DAO owns and controls no IP.
All relevant IP is owned and controlled by the Intefold Foundation or Gnosis Guild.

(b) Contract/admin powers

  • Per-contract powers (all onlyOwner, renounceOwnership disabled on every contract):

    • Interfold (upgradeable proxy): wiring of registries/verifiers, fee-token + pricing config (margin & protocol share each hard-capped at 50%), fee-token allowlist, append-only E3 program registration, disableEncryptionScheme (scheme kill-switch), timeouts, committee thresholds, restricted markE3Failed grace window.
    • CiphernodeRegistryOwnable (proxy): add/remove ciphernodes, verifier rotation (2-day timelock), sortition window, accusation-vote validity (zeroing = emergency hard-stop of slashing).
    • BondingRegistry (proxy): ticket price, bond amounts, exit delay, slashed-funds treasury, withdrawSlashedFunds/sweepLicenseSurplus (treasury spend), reward distributors, slashing-manager auth.
    • SlashingManager: Safe holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE + GOVERNANCE_ROLE; slash policies (can be staged enabled=false = "pause" a policy), two-step bans (proposer ≠ confirmer), appeals, slasher membership. Slashing submission key (SLASHER_ROLE) is a separate operator key.
    • InterfoldToken (FOLD, non-upgradeable): owner holds DEFAULT_ADMIN/MINTER/WHITELIST/LOCK_MANAGER; pre-TGE minting, TGE trigger, claim source, whitelist, lock policies; owner renounce disabled.
    • E3RefundManager (proxy): treasury, work-allocation (50% protocol cap).
  • Upgrades: TransparentUpgradeableProxy + ProxyAdmin for the four proxies (Interfold, registry, bonding, refund manager).

(c) Locked-token rights (conditional)

  • Lock/vesting: FOLD has wallet-level lock policies (createLockPolicy, write-once, LOCK_MANAGER_ROLE) with linear unlock curves and a global NO_MORE_LOCKS sunset (~Sept 2030).
  • Bonding (staking): FOLD bonded via BondingRegistry locks the token for exitDelay (1–90 days) and is slashable; bonded FOLD counts toward satisfying a lock (locked FOLD can be bonded without becoming transferable).
  • Rights conferred: only operator eligibility — bonded FOLD qualifies the owner's ciphernode for E3 sortition and fee-token rewards. No delegation to operators. tFOLD is non-transferable collateral, not a holder-rights token.
  • Cannot: withdraw locked FOLD early, delegate to ciphernodes, or vote with locked FOLD today.

(d) Current tokenholder governance rights and economic arrangements

Governance rights. Under the assumed deployment, FOLD tokenholders hold the protocol's ultimate governance authority, exercised through a two-phase Aragon OSx process of which the DAO is owner on all protocol contracts:

  • Phase 1 — secret ballot. Proposals covering the DAO's owner-level powers are voted on through the CRISP secret-ballot plugin. Votes are cast on-chain as FHE-encrypted ciphertexts with ZK proofs (verifying eligibility and correct encryption); ballots are tallied homomorphically with the proof verified on-chain, and only the aggregate result is threshold-decrypted by a sortition-selected ciphernode committee. Individual votes are never visible, and the design is receipt-free/coercion-resistant.
  • Vote weight, quorum, duration. Vote weight is the voter's FOLD balance at the snapshot block (snapshot = one block before proposal creation; the census is balance-based, coordinator-enumerated). Quorum is 2% of total FOLD supply at snapshot (≈24M of the 1.2B FOLD; enforced on-chain as turnout ≥ 2%). Voting duration is 5 days (a configurable minimum — proposals cannot close earlier). Passing rule is strict plurality: quorum met and yes strictly outvotes no; there is no supermajority/support-threshold. Votes may be changed up to the window close.
  • Binding but not self-executing. A passing ballot is a binding approval of the DAO process, but it does not execute by itself: the plugin is installed as a stage-0 body of the DAO's Staged Proposal Processor and reports its result upward. Phase 2 — the foundation multisig must explicitly approve (it retains an approval/veto gate in a later SPP stage); only then does the SPP execute the proposal's actions on the DAO, which as owner runs them on the protocol contracts. The tokenholder ballot therefore cannot unilaterally execute anything — the foundation multisig is the ratifying gate and will act in accordance with its bylaws.
  • What tokenholders can decide (the owner decision surface). Any owner-level action, within the contracts' hard bounds: fee routing (protocolShareBps, marginBps, both capped at 50%), treasury destination addresses and treasury spend (withdrawSlashedFunds, sweepLicenseSurplus, treasury claim routing), ticket price, license bond amounts, exit delays, slashing policy enablement, E3 program registration (append-only), verifier rotation (subject to a 2-day in-contract timelock), fee-token configuration, and contract upgrades (the ProxyAdmins are owned by the DAO).
  • What tokenholders cannot decide. Minting (pre-TGE MINTER/admin roles), lock/vesting policy changes (write-once), early release of locked FOLD, delegation of FOLD to ciphernodes (operator-only bonding), exceeding the 50% fee/margin caps, bypassing the foundation multisig gate, or dissolving or transferring ownership (ownership renouncement is disabled on all contracts; no dissolution mechanism exists).

Economic arrangements. Protocol-controlled resources remain routed as documented: E3 fees are split between the designated treasuries (protocolTreasury, E3RefundManager treasury, BondingRegistry.slashedFundsTreasury) and the active ciphernode committee; slashed funds go to the treasury or honest nodes per outcome. No revenue accrues to tokenholders directly — there is no fee-share, dividend, staking yield, or buyback mechanism.

(e) Control surface reliance

Anticipated evolution. The protocol is designed to start with a hybrid control surface and evolve to tokenholder sovereignty:

  • Alpha phase (protocol coming online): the tokenholder DAO (secret-ballot governance via the Staged Proposal Processor) is owner of the protocol contracts, and the foundation multisig retains early-admin powers inside the Aragon DAO — permission management over the DAO itself, the phase-2 approval/veto gate on ballot outcomes, and the ability to act on protocol parameters without a ballot. The multisig is the effective apex of the control surface in this phase: it can respond quickly to issues as the network comes online, but its authority also means tokenholder governance is operative yet subordinate — concessional and revocable.
  • Mature phase: the early-admin powers are intended to be restricted or removed by DAO proposal, after which the tokenholder DAO becomes the sole control surface, subject to the SPP execution model and the contract-level bounds below.

Persistent mitigations (phase-independent). 3-of-5 multisig signature threshold; in-contract timelocks on critical changes (2-day verifier rotation, 1-day registry swap, 2-day two-step admin transfer); hard caps on owner-set economic parameters (fee/margin ≤ 50%); append-only E3 program registration; ownership renouncement disabled on all contracts. There is no on-chain pause, so "quick response" means fast parameter/permission changes, not a protocol halt.

(f) Dissolution authority

There are no explicit dissolution mechanisms for the Interfold DAO.

04

Primary Foundation

For the Primary Foundation do the following independently. If a Foundation does not exist, state so for each sub question. Items (a)–(f) apply only if that entity exists; state explicitly that the entity doesn't exist. Definition: The primary Foundation can be explained as the entity which is directly involved in the issuance of the native token at launch.

  • (a) Entity — Type and jurisdiction.
  • (b) IP ownership & control — What IP the entity owns/controls (repos/code, trademarks/brand; license optional)
  • (c) Powers over DAO, treasury, protocol-controlled resources, and token administration — If any, describe the current powers over DAO governance, treasury actions, protocol-controlled resources (e.g. revenue), token administration, or reward parameters, and the method/threshold for each.
  • (d) Powers over DevCo — Explain whether the foundation can exert direct or indirect influence over decision-making of the DevCo.
  • (e) Contract/admin powers — Pause/upgrade/governance-executor authorities, and the method/threshold for each (e.g., veto/majority/super-majority).
  • (f) Current economic arrangements and distribution policies — Describe any current governance-approved, contractual, or programmatic mechanisms, if any, by which protocol-controlled resources, treasury assets, fees, revenue, rewards, or token distributions may be directed to this entity, its equityholders, contributors, or other participants. If no such mechanism currently exists, state that explicitly.

(a) Entity

The Interfold Foundation
Exempted Limited Guarantee Foundation Company

Cayman Islands

(b) IP ownership & control

Interfold related IP, as of at the time that it is published, is currently owned by Gnosis Guild. Currently, The Interfold Foundation does not own any IP. However, all legal ownership of IP (such as repo's, trademarks/brand, etc) will be transferred to the Interfold Foundation shortly.

(c) Powers over DAO, treasury, protocol-controlled resources, and token administration

Method/threshold for all on-chain powers: 3-of-5 Safe signature. Where a DAO ballot applies, execution requires the passing ballot (2% quorum, 5-day minimum, strict plurality) plus foundation approval via 3-of-5 Safe.

  • DAO governance: The foundation retains bootstrap admin (permission management inside the DAO; phase-2 approval/veto of ballot outcomes), intended to be restricted/removed by DAO proposal.

(d) Powers over DevCo

The foundation has no legal influence over decision-making of the DevCo. Additionally, The Interfold Foundation has no indirect influence over the DevCo (GG DAO LLC)

(e) Contract/admin powers

General method/threshold: all on-chain admin powers are exercised by 3-of-5 Safe multisig signature. There are no super-majority or vote-threshold mechanisms anywhere in the contracts — the only thresholds are the Safe's 3-of-5, ballot quorum (2% of supply, assumed model), and in-contract delays. The foundation additionally holds an approval/veto gate over DAO ballot outcomes (SPP later stage; vetoes trump approvals) and bootstrap admin permissions inside the DAO.

Pause authorities — none exist:

  • No Pausable module and no pause function on any protocol contract — there is no on-chain pause of the protocol. State this explicitly.

Upgrade authorities:

  • Four contracts are upgradeable via TransparentUpgradeableProxy with ProxyAdmin owned by the foundation Safe(s): Interfold, CiphernodeRegistryOwnable, BondingRegistry, E3RefundManager. Upgrades execute as upgradeAndCall Safe batch transactions (proposed by an operator wallet, approved/executed by ≥3 signers). No timelock on proxy upgrades themselves beyond the Safe process.
  • Non-upgradeable: InterfoldToken (FOLD) and InterfoldTicketToken (tFOLD).
  • ZK verifiers are immutable; rotation happens via owner setters on the registry, subject to a 2-day propose/commit/cancel timelock (verifier swap) and 1-day timelock (tFOLD registry swap).
  • Admin-role transfers use AccessControlDefaultAdminRules — 2-day two-step transfer delay.
  • renounceOwnership and owner-side renounceRole are disabled on all contracts (no abandonment path).

Governance-executor authorities:

  • Current state: the Safes are the sole governance executor — the complete owner decision surface: fee routing (protocolShareBps/marginBps, each capped 50%), treasury addresses + spend (withdrawSlashedFunds, sweepLicenseSurplus), ticket price, bond amounts, exit delay (1–90 days), slashing policy config, E3 program registration (append-only), committee/sortition parameters, verifier rotation.
  • Aragon DAO model: the DAO will be the executor of owner-level actions (via the SPP), with the foundation holding (a) phase-2 approval — the multisig must explicitly approve before any DAO action executes, and (b) veto — as a later SPP stage body, with vetoes trumping approvals. Ballot parameters: 5-day minimum duration, 2% quorum of total supply, strict plurality (yes > no), vote weight = FOLD balance at snapshot

Hard bounds on all of the above: fee/margin caps (50%), in-contract timelocks (2-day verifier/admin, 1-day registry), append-only program registration, disabled renouncement, no pause, no dissolution mechanism.

(f) Current economic arrangements and distribution policies

Mechanisms that direct resources to the Cayman Foundation:

  1. Protocol-allocated FOLD (48-month linear unlock) — token distribution to IF Cayman under the FOLD lock/vesting mechanism (write-once linear-unlock policy created via LOCK_MANAGER_ROLE; allocation ≈41.28% of the 1.2B supply, per tokenomics; 48-month linear unlock). Programmatic: on-chain lock curve; governance-approved: set by the owner today (Safe), by DAO ballot under the assumed model.
  2. Protocol revenue (fee share) — in-contract routing: on each successful E3, protocolShareBps (≈1.82%, cap 50%) of the gross fee is paid to the configured protocolTreasury (= IF Cayman, per your assumption). Contractual/programmatic; treasury address and share are owner-set (3-of-5).
  3. Slashed funds — slashed ciphernode bonds route to the configured slashedFundsTreasury (owner-set; if IF Cayman is that recipient, it also receives this). Programmatic, config-dependent.
  4. Grants (outbound, not inbound) — the foundation may award grants from its own allocation (discretionary, per tokenomics). Not a mechanism directing resources to it.

No mechanisms exist to direct resources to equityholders/members or other participants:

  • Equityholders/members: none — the Cayman foundation company statutorily prohibits dividends or distributions to members (limited-guarantee, non-profit design); members' liability is capped at a nominal guarantee. No buybacks, dividends, or revenue-share exist for tokenholders or the foundation's members.
  • Contributors/participants: the only programmatic distribution to protocol participants is the ciphernode reward pool (remainder of the E3 fee after the treasury share, paid to the active committee; plus FOLD incentives) — to ciphernode operators, not foundation participants.
05

Primary DevCo

For the Primary DevCo do the following independently. If an entity does not exist, state that explicitly across each sub-question. Items (a)–(f) apply only if that entity exists; state explicitly that the entity doesn't exist. Definition: The primary DevCo can be explained as the entity which is directly involved in the issuance of the native token at launch.

  • (a) Entity — Type and jurisdiction.
  • (b) IP ownership & control — What IP the entity owns/controls (repos/code, trademarks/brand; license optional)
  • (c) Powers over DAO, treasury, protocol-controlled resources, and token administration — If any, describe the current powers over DAO governance, treasury actions, protocol-controlled resources (e.g. revenue), token administration, or reward parameters, and the method/threshold for each.
  • (d) Powers over Foundation — Explain whether the DevCo can exert direct or indirect influence over decision-making of the Foundation.
  • (e) Contract/admin powers — Pause/upgrade/governance-executor authorities and the method/threshold for each (e.g., veto/majority/super-majority; "3/5 multisig").
  • (f) Current economic arrangements and distribution policies — Describe any current governance-approved, contractual, or programmatic mechanisms, if any, by which protocol-controlled resources, treasury assets, fees, revenue, rewards, or token distributions may be directed to this entity, its equityholders, contributors, or other participants. If no such mechanism currently exists, state that explicitly. Do not discuss hypothetical future dividends, repurchases, or distributions unless formally adopted.

(a) Entity

GG DAO LLC (informally known as Gnosis Guild)
Limited Liability Company
PO Box 852, MH, Majuro, 96960, MH, Marshall Islands

(b) IP ownership & control

Interfold related IP, as of at the time that it is published, is currently owned by Gnosis Guild. However, all legal ownership of IP (such as repo's, trademarks/brand, etc) will be transferred to the Interfold Foundation shortly.

(c) Powers over DAO, treasury, protocol-controlled resources, and token administration

GG DAO LLC has no direct control over treasury protocol revenue, token administration or reward parameters.

Some indirect influence will exist by virtue of FOLD vote weight in Interfold DAO. (GG DAO LLC is allocated 20% of FOLD total supply, unlocked linearly over 48 months.) Locked FOLD cannot be used for voting purposes until it is unlocked.

In the current state, the DAO in control of the Interfold Protocol must explicitly approve any proposals voted in by FOLD token holders in order for them to execute. Proposals require a >50% threshold, and have a quorum of 2%, thus GG DAO LLC, with 20% of total supply, will therefore have the ability to influence proposals indirectly in the future when tokens unlock. Having said this, in the current state, Interfold Foundation is still ultimately required to approve the transaction.

In a future state, this approval will change to veto, whereby the foundation must veto a proposal, otherwise it will pass based on token holders vote.

Eventually, the intention is to remove veto, but the timing of this is currently unknown.

(d) Powers over Foundation

No legal influence over the foundation. Neither the DevCo, nor its stakeholders, are on the board of the Foundation.

Currently, the DAO cannot appoint or remove a Foundation Director. Additionally, the DevCo cannot appoint or remove a Foundation Director.

The governing document of the DevCo (GG DAO LLC) is the Certificate of Formation, under Marshall Islands Limited Liability Company Act.

The governing document of The Interfold Foundation is the Memorandum and Articles of Association, under the Foundation Companies Act, Cayman Islands.

The DevCo (GG DAO LLC) has a master service agreement with The Interfold Foundation to provide development and maintenance services on The Interfold Protocol. This work (services) are in cooperation with The Interfold Foundation, and it does not act on its own. As a result, this represents some indirect influence over the Interfold Foundation.

(e) Contract/admin powers

None

(f) Current economic arrangements and distribution policies

GG DAO LLC (informally referred to as Gnosis Guild), a service provider to The Interfold Foundation, has a master service agreement in place with The Interfold Foundation to provide the following scope of services: protocol research, development and maintenance, technical operations and infrastructure, security coordination, community, marketing and ecosystem support services. The MSA pays for monthly costs incurred for the services in USDC to GG DAO LLC's multi-sig.

GG DAO LLC has a 20% FOLD allocation, 48-month linear vest, starting September 1, 2026, over time this will likely represent the largest economic flow to GG DAO LLC. The current MSA monthly rate fluctuates due to changing operating costs, but on average is approximately $150k per month.

Token Supply & Allocations

06

Initial Allocation

Download the Worksheet, enable macros, complete the Initial Allocation sheet, then use Convert To CSV to export the file for import here. To make edits after importing, update the worksheet, use Convert To CSV again, then re-import the new CSV.

Ticker

Date

Allocation Category Name

Recipient Type

Allocation %

Allocation Tokens

TGE Unlock %

TGE Unlock Tokens

Cliff Months

Cliff Unlock %

Linear Vesting Months

Cadence Months

Circulating Treatment

Notes on what each category is used for

If applicable: Contract / Wallet address

FOLD

2026-08-19

Investors

Private / VC

0.188479988361873

226175986.034248

1

226175986.034248

0

0

0

1

No

Aggregate pre-TGE token sales: pre-seed/angel round incl. bonus, private seed, Legion, Aragon bridge and CCA. Exact token count 226,175,986.0342478 is the sum of those six rounds. 100% unlocked at TGE, no cliff or vesting. Predominantly private rounds but includes the Legion and CCA public-sale tranches (88,470,221.61 tokens combined); classified Private / VC on the majority. Source: issuer internal '[Final] FOLD Token Allocation' sheet.

FOLD

2026-08-19

Airdrop

Community

0.04

48000000

0

0

0

0

24

1

Conditional

Community airdrop budget, stated as 'up to 4%'. Budget releases in 24 equal monthly tranches of 2,000,000 from 2026-09-01 to 2028-08-31; no TGE unlock. Marked Conditional because released tokens require a separate claim/distribution before reaching public hands; the issuer's internal model counts them as circulating on release. Source: issuer internal '[Final] FOLD Token Allocation' sheet.

FOLD

2026-08-19

Gnosis Guild

Insiders

0.2

240000000

0

0

0

0

48

1

No

Allocation to Gnosis Guild, the studio that incubated the project; treated as an insider/strategic entity. 48 equal monthly unlocks of 5,000,000 from 2026-09-01 to 2030-08-31, no TGE unlock and no cliff. Source: issuer internal '[Final] FOLD Token Allocation' sheet.

FOLD

2026-08-19

Team & Advisors

Insiders

0.0950687885

114082546.2

0

0

0

0

24

1

No

Core contributors and advisors. 24 equal monthly unlocks of ~4,753,439 from 2026-09-01 to 2028-08-31, no TGE unlock and no cliff. Exact token count 114,082,546.2 (9.50687885% of the 1,200,000,000 total supply). Source: issuer internal '[Final] FOLD Token Allocation' sheet.

FOLD

2026-08-19

Treasury

Treasury

0.412851223138127

495421467.765752

0

0

0

0

48

1

Conditional

Protocol/foundation treasury funding ecosystem growth and operations. 48 equal monthly unlocks of ~10,321,281 from 2026-09-01 to 2030-08-31, no TGE unlock and no cliff. Conditional because unlocked treasury tokens require a discretionary treasury spend, grant or sale before entering public hands. Treasury is the residual plug in the source model: 41.2851223138127% of supply, exactly 495,421,467.7657522 tokens, so the six categories total exactly 1,200,000,000. Source: issuer internal '[Final] FOLD Token Allocation' sheet.

FOLD

2026-08-19

Unsold CCA tokens for fundraising and/or liquidity (unlocked)

Liquidity

0.0636

76320000

1

76320000

0

0

0

1

No

Tokens left unsold in the CCA, retained unlocked for further fundraising and/or liquidity provision. 100% unlocked at TGE, no cliff or vesting. Marked No because the issuer's model counts this tranche in circulating supply at TGE (with Investors it gives the stated 25.21% circulating at TGE). Source: issuer internal '[Final] FOLD Token Allocation' sheet.

07

Airdrop Process

State the project's airdrop status plainly, and back it up:

  • Never conducted and none planned for TGE: state so plainly.
  • Planned but not yet executed: state the target user segments (e.g., "stakers of X," "Aave users") and the allocation method (e.g., proportional to balance or net position), and commit to publishing a recipient wallet list in a public channel and providing it to Blockworks quarterly until the initial TGE airdrop is fully completed.
  • Already executed: state the covered user segments and the allocation method, and point to a per-address source such as CSV/TSV/JSON files, a Dune table, a full Merkle dump, GitHub repo files embedding per-address allocations, or RPC endpoints that expose claim/amount data; explorer links alone do not count.

4% of supply was airdropped to web3, privacy and security experts and organizations in order to recognize contributions to the space. This allocation is has already been executed, is vested over 24 months and has already been fully allocated.

Individuals on the list received 240,000 FOLD (total).

Each individual received 1,200,000,000 * 0.2 / 100

Organizations received 2,000,000 FOLD (total).

Each organization received 1,200,000,000 * 0.2 / 10

All recipients were hand selected by the Interfold team in recognition of past contributions to Ethereum, privacy, security, and culture.

A full list of airdrop recipients will corresponding amounts can be found here:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/12ng8EUx5GJBkNwOXsHXeSz214HEn3CBdtmQCnKjw5_4/edit?usp=sharing

Transactions & Market Structures

08

Market Maker Agreements & Deals

Projects must disclose all material terms of market-making arrangements that affect token liquidity. If the project has no agreements or deals with market makers, state that explicitly. For each market maker, include in a table:

  • (a) Market maker's name — the market maker's name;
  • (b) Token allocation or loaned amount — the token allocation or loaned amount as a percentage of total supply;
  • (c) Duration/term of agreement — the duration/term of the agreement; and, where applicable,
  • (d) Name of agreement structure — label the financial vehicle being used in the agreement (i.e. loan, option/call, retainer model).

If no native tokens were loaned or allocated to market makers, state that explicitly; cash/fiat retainers or fees are not required for (b).

Market Maker Name

Token Allocation Committed

Term Duration

Structure Name

None but subject to change at short notice

09

Exchange Agreements & Deals

Projects must disclose all material terms of centralized or decentralized exchange listings that affect token liquidity. For each listing, include in a table:

  • (a) Exchange name / DEX pool — the exchange name (and, for DEX, the specific pool/pair);
  • (b) Token allocation for listing — the token allocation supplied or committed for listing as a percentage of total supply;
  • (c) Term Duration — the duration/term of any listing lockups, liquidity, or incentive programs; and, where applicable,
  • (d) Native-token listing fees — whether any listing fees were paid in native tokens, with amounts (tokens or % of supply), recipients, and any vesting or lock terms tied to the partnership.

If the project has no agreements or deals with CEX or DEX, state that explicitly; doing so earns full credit; cash/fiat fee amounts are not required for this item.

Exchange Name

Token Allocation Committed

Term Duration

Native Token Listing Fees

Uniswap v4 pool (https://app.uniswap.org/positions/v4/ethereum/339069)

10.92M FOLD / 130.99 ETH

Indefinite

No listing fees

Financial Disclosures & Risks

10

Prior Token Sales & Fundraising

Disclose all prior token sales by the Project — including fundraising rounds, any material OTC sales to investors, and any discounted market-maker sales. For each sale, provide:

  • (a) Series Name;
  • (b) Early-Stage Investment Instrument used (i.e. SAFT, STAMP, SAFE, SAFE+Token Warrant, etc.);
  • (c) Date of sale (at least month & year);
  • (d) Number of tokens sold (or % of total supply);
  • (e) Vesting schedule.

If no prior sales occurred, state that explicitly (e.g., "No prior fundraising, OTC, or discounted MM sales have occurred.").

Series Name

Investment Instrument

Date Of Sale

Number of tokens sold

Vesting Schedule

Pre-seed/angel round

SAFT

May 14, 2024 - June 14, 2024

64149600

Fully unlocked at token transferability event

Private Seed

SAFT

Jan 5, 2025 - May 23, 2025

61,954,246

Fully unlocked at token transferability event

Legion round

TPA

Jan 5, 2025 - May 23, 2025

44,808,281

Fully unlocked at token transferability event

Aragon grant

Grant

June 26, 2026

11,601,919

Fully unlocked at token transferability event

CCA

Smart contract

Jul 8, 2026 - July 10, 2026

43,661,941

Fully unlocked at token transferability event

11

Previous Exploits Affecting The Native Token

If any, list prior exploits or incidents that directly affected the token, token supply, tokenholder balances, token contract, minting controls, burn mechanics, or custody of token supply. This question is not asking about general protocol, application, or smart contract exploits unless the incident directly affected the native token itself. If no prior incidents, state this explicitly (e.g., "No exploits affecting tokenholders or protocol funds as of YYYY-MM-DD").

  • (a) Date & component affected — Date (YYYY-MM or YYYY-MM-DD), chain(s)/component affected.
  • (b) Exploit vector summary — Plain-language summary of the exploit vector (what the hack was).
  • (c) Quantified impact — Quantified impact (assets/tokens affected or a clear "no loss of funds" statement).
  • (d) Remediation/response taken — Remediation/response taken (patches, upgrades, governance actions, compensation).
  • (e) Current status — Current status (resolved, in litigation, under investigation, refunded, etc.).
  • (f) References — Link(s) to post-mortem/advisory/PR.

(a) Date & component affected

No exploits affecting the native token, tokenholder balances or custody as of 2026-08-17

(b) Exploit vector summary

No exploits affecting the native token, tokenholder balances or custody as of 2026-08-17

(c) Quantified impact

No exploits affecting the native token, tokenholder balances or custody as of 2026-08-17

(d) Remediation/response taken

No exploits affecting the native token, tokenholder balances or custody as of 2026-08-17

(e) Current status

No exploits affecting the native token, tokenholder balances or custody as of 2026-08-17

(f) References

N/A

12

Material Risk Factors (Regulation, Technology, Token Economics)

Describe material risk factors across the three categories below. Each category includes prompts to address at a minimum.

  • (a) Regulatory, Legal & Tax Risks — Describe how evolving laws and regulations could affect the project by answering, at a minimum, questions like:

  • Impact of Regulatory Change on TGE and Listings: (If applicable) How could evolving or conflicting laws and regulations affect your ability to complete the TGE, deliver tokens to purchasers, and list or maintain the token on trading venues in key jurisdictions?

  • Entity-Level Regulatory Impact: (If applicable) How could regulatory or legal changes impact your core entities (Foundation, DevCo, DAO, affiliated service providers), including enforcement actions, licensing requirements, or forced changes to structure or operations?

  • Tokenholder Tax Treatment: (If applicable) What uncertainties exist around how tokenholders may be taxed, and make clear that tokenholders are responsible for understanding their own tax obligations?

  • Jurisdictional & User Access Restrictions: (If applicable) If the project restricts access for certain jurisdictions or user types (e.g., U.S. persons, sanctioned countries, retail vs. professional), what are those restrictions and what risks do they create for users and for the project?

  • (b) Protocol, Technology & Security Risks — Describe risks to network and contract reliability, correctness, and safety by answering, at a minimum, questions like:

  • Bugs and Design Flaws: (If applicable) What bugs, design flaws, or implementation errors could exist in your core protocol code, smart contracts, and any bridges, rollups, or oracles that you depend on, and how could these lead to loss of funds or disruption of the protocol?

  • Security Measures & Their Limitations: (If applicable) What security measures have you taken (audits, formal verification, bug bounties), and what types of failures might these measures still fail to detect or prevent?

  • (c) Token Economics, Unlocks & Incentive Risks — Describe how the token's economic design and supply schedule could affect holders by answering, at a minimum, questions like:

  • Critical Economic Assumptions: (If applicable) Which economic assumptions (e.g., staking yields, fee revenue, liquidity incentives, MEV capture, demand for blockspace) are critical for protocol security, utility, and governance, and what happens if those assumptions fail?

  • Governance Control over Monetary Policy & Rewards: (If applicable) To what extent can governance change monetary policy, fee parameters, or reward allocations (e.g., inflation rate, treasury flows, incentive programs), and how could such changes adversely affect tokenholders?

(a) Regulatory, Legal & Tax Risks

Regulatory uncertainty in the United States, including the criteria by which digital assets are classified as securities, presents a material risk to the FOLD token. A potential US securities treatment could limit CEX listings.

Restrictive privacy regulations could limit The Interfold's front-end user interface access based on jurisdiction, though the protocol would remain open.

(b) Protocol, Technology & Security Risks

Whilst codebase associated with the Interfold protocol has already undergone extensive auditing, the risk of innovative AI-engineered attack vectors still remains. It is recognized that AI hardening of the Interfold protocol codebase must continue, despite existing production deployment readiness.

The Interfold protocol is provided WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

(c) Token Economics, Unlocks & Incentive Risks

Approximately 25% of the total supply of FOLD will be unlocked and tradable at the time of token transferability. Holders may sell without restriction, and significant sales, or the expectation of them, could reduce the market price of FOLD and adversely affect market perception of the token thereafter. No assurance can be given as to the price at which FOLD will trade.

This Token Transparency Filing is provided for general informational purposes only. Blockworks reviews completeness only and does not verify or warrant the accuracy of individual answers. The Interfold is solely responsible for the content, accuracy, and legality of its disclosures.