Provide a concise narrative that clearly states each of (a)–(e) below.
Aethir identifies a structural supply shortage of enterprise-grade GPU compute for AI training, inference, cloud gaming, and virtualized compute applications. Incumbent cloud providers — primarily hyperscalers — cannot meet the pace of demand growth, creating fragmented access and high cost barriers for AI and gaming developers.
(Source: Aethir Executive Summary, Aethir Introduction)
Aethir operates a three-role network model: Containers execute compute workloads, Checkers verify integrity and performance, and Indexers match end users to Containers. Resource owners earn ATH rewards for contributing compute. Checker node operators earn ATH through base mining rewards (10% of total supply over four years) and performance-based bonus rewards (5% of total supply over four years). Ongoing user engagement is supported through a multi-season staking and airdrop reward program.
(Source: Aethir FAQ, Checker Node Key Information, Mainnet Launch)
The protocol routes compute demand through three network roles. Containers are the compute endpoints where AI and gaming workloads execute. Checkers monitor and attest to Container performance and service delivery. Indexers function as coordinators, matching users to available Containers based on technical requirements and negotiating service-level agreements.
(Source: Aethir Executive Summary, Aethir FAQ)
ATH functions as a governance token, a medium of exchange for purchasing compute services, a staking and collateral asset, and a reward currency for Checker node operators and compute resource providers.
(Source: ATH Token Utility, FAQ)
ATH holders vote on governance decisions through the veATH mechanism. The Foundation Board holds ultimate veto authority over governance proposals, manages the treasury, and allocates funds for ecosystem growth, though any vetoed proposal can be overridden by a 75% community vote. Multi-signature wallets retain administrative powers including the ability to pause certain protocol functionality, reverse or pause slashing, and implement protocol upgrades. The Foundation has stated its intention to progressively transfer control of those wallets to the community and independent parties over time.
(Source: Aethir Foundation Bylaws, Airdrop Terms of Service)
For each existing entity: Labs/DevCo (e.g., Founder, CEO, CTO, COO), Foundation (e.g., President, Executive Director, CFO, COO), and DAO / onchain governance leadership (if applicable) list the: (a) full names, (b) official titles, (c) and prior experience of key team members. For any non-existent entity, explicitly mention it does not exist. External links may be included but they will not factor into the score.
Full Name | Entity | Official Title | Prior Experience |
|---|---|---|---|
Daniel Wang | Labs | Co-founder and CEO | Mythos Venture Partners, IVC, YGG SEA, Riot Games |
Mark Rydon | Labs | Co-founder and CCO | NOTA Platform, Flux Capital, Gaas LTD, Kulture Athletics, Bechtel Corporation |
Kyle Okamoto | Labs | CTO | Ericsson, Edge Gravity, Verizon Media |
Paul Thind | Labs | CRO | Triggerspot (co-founder), Creadits (advisor), Trick Studio (advisor) |
Blockworks note: No named DCI Foundation officers identified in reviewed public sources. The DCI Foundation is identified as the operating entity in Aethir's terms of service, but no named officer roster is published in publicly reviewed materials. The Foundation Bylaws establish a Council structure with elected representatives from three stakeholder classes (Compute Providers, Checkers, and ATH Token Holders), an appointed Indexer, a Foundation Board, and a community-elected Sentinels multisig group. Governance is conducted via veATH tokens earned by staking ATH. No individual named officeholders for these elected positions are identified in reviewed public sources. |
Provide a structured description of the DAO's governance, powers, and economic rights. If a DAO does not exist, state so. Address the lettered items below. Even if there is no DAO, there must be an answer to (d).
The public record does not disclose which entity holds IP ownership of the Aethir codebase, trademarks, or brand assets.
(Source: Airdrop Terms of Service, Aethir General Terms of Service)
The Foundation Board holds ultimate veto authority over all governance proposals and manages the protocol treasury. A community-elected Sentinels multisig holds veto power over proposals deemed malicious or technically threatening, subject to Council approval and overridable by a 75% community vote; the override mechanism activates 24 months after governance launch. Multi-signature wallets can pause certain protocol functionality, reverse or pause slashing, implement upgrades, and make other functional changes. Some of those wallets may be controlled by the Foundation or contributors engaged by it; others may be partially or entirely controlled by unaffiliated committee members. Governance proposals above a certain threshold require on-chain voting via veATH, with quorum thresholds differentiated by proposal type: reward-impacting proposals require a 25% Temperature Check quorum and 70% Decision quorum of staked supply; protocol or stake-base proposals require a 12.5% Temperature Check quorum and 60% Decision quorum.
(Source: Aethir Foundation Bylaws, Airdrop Terms of Service)
ATH holders vote on governance decisions with voting power proportional to ATH holdings. Staked ATH (gATH) carries a 1.5x voting power multiplier. Users may stake ATH without a lock-up, receiving stATH (transferable), or lock staked ATH for up to four years, receiving veATH (non-transferable), which provides enhanced governance rights. During the initial two years following governance launch, only Council Members may submit formal governance proposals. After that period, ATH holders controlling 5% or more of circulating supply may propose directly.
(Source: Aethir FAQ, Aethir Foundation Bylaws, Mainnet Launch)
The public record does not disclose a governance-approved or contractual mechanism by which protocol revenue or treasury assets are distributed to ATH holders. No revenue-sharing, buyback, or dividend mechanism has been publicly announced.
(Source: Aethir FAQ, Airdrop Terms of Service)
The public record does not disclose a mechanism for dissolution or wind-up of the DAO or the DCI Foundation.
(Source: Aethir FAQ, Airdrop Terms of Service)
For the Primary Foundation do the following independently. If an entity does not exist, state that explicitly. Items (a)–(f) apply only if that entity exists; state explicitly that the entity doesn't exist. Definitions: The primary Foundation and DevCo can be explained as those entities which are directly involved in the issuance of the native token at launch.
The primary foundation is DCI Foundation, a Panama foundation company. Panama foundation companies are governed by Law No. 25 of June 12, 1995, operate as standalone legal entities without shareholders, and may hold assets and enter into contracts independently.
(Source: Aethir General Terms of Service)
The Aethir General Terms of Service state that docs.aethir.com and its subdomains are operated by or on behalf of DCI Foundation, and that the Services encompass the website, content, tools, documentation, features, and functionality made available through the site. The public record does not disclose a broader IP ownership map, subsidiary structure, or code repository ownership attribution.
(Source: Aethir General Terms of Service)
The Foundation Bylaws give the Foundation Board ultimate veto authority over all governance proposals, treasury management authority, and responsibility for allocating funds for ecosystem growth. Multi-signature wallets — some of which may be controlled by the Foundation or contributors engaged by it — hold administrative powers including pausing protocol functionality, reversing or pausing slashing, and implementing protocol upgrades. The public record does not disclose the specific threshold or method required for treasury disbursements or token-administration decisions beyond the governance quorum requirements described in the Bylaws.
(Source: Aethir Foundation Bylaws, Airdrop Terms of Service)
No separate primary DevCo legal entity has been identified in public sources, and the public record does not disclose the Foundation's powers over any development company entity.
(Source: Aethir General Terms of Service)
Multi-signature wallets tied to the protocol and ATH tokens hold powers to pause certain functionality, reverse or pause slashing, and implement or influence upgrades. The Foundation controls some of those wallets directly or through engaged contributors; unaffiliated committee members control others. A community-elected Sentinels multisig can veto proposals deemed malicious, subject to Council approval and a 75% community override threshold. The public record does not disclose the complete signing threshold for each multisig wallet.
(Source: Airdrop Terms of Service, Aethir Foundation Bylaws)
The public record does not disclose a governance-approved, contractual, or programmatic mechanism by which protocol revenue, treasury assets, or token distributions are directed to DCI Foundation, its contributors, or related parties, beyond the publicly disclosed token-distribution and vesting schedules described in Section 6.
(Source: Token Vesting)
For the Primary DevCo do the following independently. If an entity does not exist, state that explicitly. Items (a)–(f) apply only if that entity exists; state explicitly that the entity doesn't exist. Definitions: The primary Foundation and DevCo can be explained as those entities which are directly involved in the issuance of the native token at launch.
No separate primary DevCo legal entity has been identified in public sources.
No separate primary DevCo legal entity has been identified in public sources.
No separate primary DevCo legal entity has been identified in public sources.
No separate primary DevCo legal entity has been identified in public sources.
No separate primary DevCo legal entity has been identified in public sources.
No separate primary DevCo legal entity has been identified in public sources.
Blockworks note: No separate primary DevCo legal entity has been identified in public sources. Aethir is described in third-party databases as a Singapore-headquartered company founded in 2021 by Mark Rydon and Daniel Wang, but no formal DevCo legal name, jurisdiction of incorporation, or organizational structure separate from DCI Foundation has been publicly disclosed in Aethir's own materials. Items (a) through (f) cannot be completed because no primary DevCo legal entity has been identified.
(Source: Aethir General Terms of Service, Checker Node Sale: Key Information, Tracxn)
Disclose launch and initial supply details in a single initial allocation schedule covering the token's launch.
Aethir's total ATH supply is 42,000,000,000 tokens. The TGE occurred on June 12, 2024. At TGE, circulating supply was approximately 3,822,087,401 ATH (approximately 9.1% of total supply). As of June 2026, approximately 20,128,764,593 ATH (47.93% of total supply) has been unlocked; the remaining 52.07% remains locked and vests according to the schedules below, with full unlock extending into 2028.
(Source: Token Overview, ATH Circulating Supply, Tokenomist)
(Source: Token Distribution, Token Vesting, Checker Node Sale, Tokenomist, Gate Learn)
No fixed initial token sale price was set for ATH. ATH launched via open-market listing on June 12, 2024. The ATH all-time high of approximately $0.11 was recorded on June 13, 2024, the day after TGE.
(Source: Mainnet Launch, CryptoSlate)
ATH
(Source: Token Overview)
Total supply is fixed at 42,000,000,000 ATH. The public record does not disclose an inflation mechanism, token burn schedule, or any mechanism to increase supply beyond 42 billion. The supply is not programmatically inflationary.
(Source: Token Overview, Aethir Tokenomics)
Team: 18-month cliff from TGE (cliff date: December 2025), then 36-month linear vest through approximately December 2028. Investors: 12-month cliff from TGE (cliff date: June 2025), then 24-month linear vest through approximately June 2027. Airdrop: Season 1 at listing (June 2024), Season 2 at 8 months post-listing (February 2025), Season 3 at 16 months post-listing (October 2025). Ecosystem Development: 50% at TGE, balance linearly over 24 months through approximately June 2026. DAO Treasury: 100% linearly over 48 months from TGE through approximately June 2028. Checker Nodes: base rewards (10%) released linearly over 4 years from TGE based on performance guidelines; bonus rewards (5%) released linearly over 4 years to qualifying nodes. Full unlock of all categories extends to approximately 2028.
(Source: Token Vesting, Checker Node Sale, Tokenomist)
Address each of the following sub-items based on the project's airdrop status. If a sub-item does not apply to the project's situation, state that explicitly.
Planned but not yet executed airdrop: Not applicable as to the initial TGE airdrop, which has been executed. Note that Season 1 claimants who staked their ATH became eligible for Season 2 and Season 3 distributions; to the extent those seasons remain undistributed, the segments and allocation basis are described in sub-item (b).
Executed airdrop: Per-address source: The ATH airdrop has been executed. No CSV, JSON file, Merkle dump, Dune table, RPC endpoint, or equivalent per-address public data source has been identified in the public record for the Aethir Cloud Drop airdrop. The Season 1 claim portal at claims.aethir.com allowed individual address eligibility checks but does not constitute a public per-address data disclosure surface. (Source: Mainnet Launch, Airdrop Terms of Service)
Covered user segments and allocation method: Season 1 recipients included Aethir Checker Node holders, Aethir OGs, and participants in the Aethir Cloud Drop campaign who completed badge requirements through Galxe and Layer3 quests. Anti-Sybil filtering was applied, including cluster analysis, wallet funding source review, and exclusion of addresses without transactions on major EVM chains. Allocation amounts varied by participant category and eligibility criteria set by the Foundation. Users who claimed and staked Season 1 ATH became eligible for Season 2 and Season 3 distributions. (Source: Mainnet Launch, Airdrop Terms of Service, Aethir Cloud Drop)
No airdrop planned or conducted: Not applicable. Aethir has conducted an airdrop.
Projects must disclose all material terms of market-making arrangements that affect token liquidity. If the project has no agreements or deals with market makers, state that explicitly; doing so earns full credit. For each market maker, include in a table:
If the project has no agreements or deals with market makers, state that explicitly; doing so earns full credit. If no native tokens were loaned or allocated to market makers, state that explicitly; cash/fiat retainers or fees are not required for this item.
Blockworks note: The public record does not disclose any market-making agreements, token loan arrangements, or liquidity-provider contracts for ATH tokens. No native-token allocations to market makers are publicly disclosed.
(Source: Token Overview, Mainnet Launch)
Projects must disclose all material terms of centralized or decentralized exchange listings that affect token liquidity. For each listing, include in a table:
If the project has no agreements or deals with CEX or DEX, state that explicitly; doing so earns full credit; cash/fiat fee amounts are not required for this item.
Blockworks note: The public record does not disclose CEX or DEX listing agreements, token-denominated listing allocations, native-token listing fees, or liquidity incentive program terms for ATH. ATH is listed on Binance, Upbit, Bithumb, HTX, Coinbase (as of March 2025), and other exchanges, but the material terms of those listing arrangements are not publicly disclosed.
(Source: Token Overview, Mainnet Launch, Messari)
Disclose all prior token sales by the Project — including fundraising rounds, any material OTC sales to investors, and any discounted market-maker sales. For each sale, provide:
If no prior sales occurred, state that explicitly (e.g., "No prior fundraising, OTC, or discounted MM sales have occurred.").
Blockworks note: Aethir completed at least three publicly identified fundraising events prior to and concurrent with TGE. The full token-sale ledger with series names, instruments, token amounts per round, and per-round vesting schedules is not publicly disclosed.
Round 1: Seed (January 2022): Led by Framework Ventures and Infinity Ventures Crypto. Dollar amount not publicly disclosed. No token amount or vesting schedule publicly disclosed.
Round 2: Pre-Series A (July 26, 2023): Led by Sanctor Capital, Hashkey, Merit Circle, and CitizenX. Additional participants included Mirana Ventures, Animoca Brands, Momentum6, Big Brain Holdings, Builder Capital, Tess Ventures, and Maelstrom (Arthur Hayes). Total raised: over $9,000,000. Company valuation at close: $150,000,000. Investment instrument not publicly disclosed. Token amount and vesting schedule not publicly disclosed.
Round 3: Checker Node Sale (March 20, 2024): Public node-license sale conducted on Arbitrum via Impossible Finance. Over 66,000 Checker Node licenses sold to over 20,000 buyers at tiered pricing starting at $500 per node. Gross proceeds: approximately 29,000 ETH (valued at approximately $100,000,000 using the fixed rate of $3,970.985 per ETH set for the sale). Node operators earn up to 15% of total ATH supply over four years as described in Section 6. Licenses are transferable one year post-sale. Rewards vest per performance guidelines rather than a fixed calendar schedule.
(Source: Aethir Pre-A Announcement, Checker Node Sale, Token Vesting, Aethir 2024 Wrap-Up)
If any, list prior exploits or incidents that directly affected the token, token supply, tokenholder balances, token contract, minting controls, burn mechanics, or custody of token supply. This question is not asking about general protocol, application, or smart contract exploits unless the incident directly affected the native token itself. If no prior incidents, state this explicitly (e.g., "No exploits affecting tokenholders or protocol funds as of YYYY-MM-DD").
2026-04-09. The exploit targeted AethirOFTAdapter, Aethir's cross-chain bridge contract on BNB Chain connecting to other chains including Ethereum.
(Source: Cointelegraph, DEV Community Post-Mortem)
The attacker exploited a vulnerability in the AethirOFTAdapter contract on BNB Chain to drain ATH tokens, then bridged the stolen funds from BNB Chain to Tron using Symbiosis Finance. As of April 10, 2026, stolen funds remained dormant across two Tron addresses with no further transfers or cash-out activity observed.
(Source: Cointelegraph, DEV Community Post-Mortem, BanklessTimes)
Aethir reported user losses under $90,000. PeckShield estimated gross funds drained at approximately $400,000 (approximately 423,000 ATH). The discrepancy reflects the difference between gross token value drained from the contract and confirmed direct user losses after rapid contract disconnection. The ETH-ARB bridge on Squid and the main ATH supply on Ethereum were unaffected.
(Source: Cointelegraph, CryptoPotato)
Aethir disconnected all compromised bridge contracts immediately upon detection. The team coordinated with Binance, Upbit, Bithumb, and HTX to blacklist attacker wallets. ZeroShadow provided forensic analysis to trace stolen funds. Aethir patched the vulnerable contracts, initiated comprehensive audits of related bridge code, and committed to publishing a full compensation plan for affected users, a complete list of attacker wallets, and a detailed post-mortem and repayment plan via Discord.
(Source: Cointelegraph, MEXC News, BanklessTimes)
As of the filing date, the public record confirms that the breach was patched and a compensation plan was announced, but a publicly accessible post-mortem document and confirmed compensation execution have not been verified in reviewed sources.
The main ATH supply on Ethereum remains fully intact. The platform remained operational throughout the incident. Stolen funds were last observed dormant on two Tron addresses as of April 10, 2026.
(Source: CoinMarketCap AI Updates, Cointelegraph)
(Source: Cointelegraph Incident Report, DEV Community Technical Post-Mortem)
Describe material risk factors across the three categories below. Each category includes prompts to address at a minimum.
(a) Regulatory, Legal & Tax Risks — Describe how evolving laws and regulations could affect the project by answering, at a minimum, questions like:
Impact of Regulatory Change on TGE and Listings: (If applicable) How could evolving or conflicting laws and regulations affect your ability to complete the TGE, deliver tokens to purchasers, and list or maintain the token on trading venues in key jurisdictions?
Entity-Level Regulatory Impact: (If applicable) How could regulatory or legal changes impact your core entities (Foundation, DevCo, DAO, affiliated service providers), including enforcement actions, licensing requirements, or forced changes to structure or operations?
Tokenholder Tax Treatment: (If applicable) What uncertainties exist around how tokenholders may be taxed, and make clear that tokenholders are responsible for understanding their own tax obligations?
Jurisdictional & User Access Restrictions: (If applicable) If the project restricts access for certain jurisdictions or user types (e.g., U.S. persons, sanctioned countries, retail vs. professional), what are those restrictions and what risks do they create for users and for the project?
(b) Protocol, Technology & Security Risks — Describe risks to network and contract reliability, correctness, and safety by answering, at a minimum, questions like:
Bugs and Design Flaws: (If applicable) What bugs, design flaws, or implementation errors could exist in your core protocol code, smart contracts, and any bridges, rollups, or oracles that you depend on, and how could these lead to loss of funds or disruption of the protocol?
Security Measures & Their Limitations: (If applicable) What security measures have you taken (audits, formal verification, bug bounties), and what types of failures might these measures still fail to detect or prevent?
(c) Token Economics, Unlocks & Incentive Risks — Describe how the token's economic design and supply schedule could affect holders by answering, at a minimum, questions like:
Critical Economic Assumptions: (If applicable) Which economic assumptions (e.g., staking yields, fee revenue, liquidity incentives, MEV capture, demand for blockspace) are critical for protocol security, utility, and governance, and what happens if those assumptions fail?
Governance Control over Monetary Policy & Rewards: (If applicable) To what extent can governance change monetary policy, fee parameters, or reward allocations (e.g., inflation rate, treasury flows, incentive programs), and how could such changes adversely affect tokenholders?
DCI Foundation, a Panama foundation company, operates the Aethir website and services. Access is restricted to users who are at least 18 years old and are not Prohibited Persons, defined to include sanctioned persons and individuals located in or connected to Sanctioned Jurisdictions. Airdrop claim addresses and IP addresses are screened under sanctions and risk controls and may be excluded from ATH distributions. Expanded sanctions enforcement, licensing requirements applicable to foundation entities, or regulatory action against the protocol structure could restrict token access, affect ATH's listing status on regulated venues, or compel operational restructuring.
The Foundation or its subsidiaries may bear tax reporting obligations in various jurisdictions with respect to ATH tokens. Tokenholders are individually responsible for determining their own tax treatment of ATH receipt, staking, and trading under applicable law. Tax treatment of DePIN rewards, governance tokens, and staking receipts (including stATH and veATH) varies by jurisdiction and remains unsettled in many markets.
(Source: Aethir General Terms of Service, Airdrop Terms of Service)
Aethir's network depends on correct operation across Containers, Checkers, Indexers, staking contracts, bridge contracts, and oracle infrastructure. Bugs, design flaws, or implementation errors in any of those components could result in loss of staked tokens, incorrect reward distribution, service disruption, or unauthorized asset transfers. The April 9, 2026 AethirOFTAdapter exploit — in which approximately $400,000 in ATH was drained from a bridge contract on BNB Chain — demonstrates that cross-chain bridge components present material attack surface even in an audited protocol.
Aethir has retained CertIK as an auditor and discloses checker-node and slashing controls. Audits and security reviews do not guarantee the absence of undiscovered vulnerabilities. The Aethir terms acknowledge that cyberattacks, security breaches, private-key compromise, and third-party failures could cause losses or adversely affect the protocol or ATH tokens.
(Source: Aethir FAQ, Airdrop Terms of Service, Cointelegraph, DEV Community Post-Mortem)
Aethir's tokenomics depend on sustained enterprise and developer demand for GPU compute, continued Checker node operator participation, and ongoing staking engagement. Resource owners earn ATH for contributing compute; developers pay ATH to access services; token utility therefore depends on the balance between compute supply and demand remaining economically viable for both sides.
The supply schedule presents concentration risk. Approximately 52% of total supply remains locked as of June 2026, with investor unlocks completing in mid-2027, team unlocks completing in December 2028, and DAO Treasury releases continuing through June 2028. Elevated unlock cadences — particularly from the investor cliff in June 2025 and the team cliff in December 2025 — represent selling pressure windows. If compute demand, staking participation, or node operator activity weakens, the reward assumptions embedded in the 15% checker-node allocation and the multi-season airdrop program could underperform, reducing incentive to hold or operate within the network. The Foundation Board retains authority to modify reward parameters and treasury allocations through governance, which introduces the risk that token emission or reward policies change materially without supermajority tokenholder approval.
(Source: Token Vesting, Checker Node Sale, Aethir Foundation Bylaws, Tokenomist)
This Token Transparency Filing is provided for general informational purposes only and does not verify or warrant the accuracy of individual answers.
