In simple terms, TCRs are incentive systems designed to produce a list. There are three types of participant:
- Applicants submit fees and apply to be included on the list.
- Curators are token holders who may earn tokens by voting to admit or to reject applicants.
- Consumers access information on the curated list for free.
You need a blockchain for TCRs as they have the following benefits:
- Wisdom of the crowd
- Risk mitigation
- Sock-puppet resistance
- Censorship resistance
- Transparency
- Skin in the game
- Anti-spam
- Marketing and R&D budget
However, the value proposition of TCRs is reduced under the following circumstances:
- There already exists a reputed central curator
- The central platform can be trusted
- The three groups of participants donβt want economic transfer, e.g., applicants donβt want to pay to be included on a list
Known problems and practical solutions for TCRs include:
- Chicken-egg problem: TCR developers should being speaking with a few potential applicants who are most likely to support the project and presenting to them a set of compelling reasons for joining the registry while building an incentive structure for early applicants
- Lack of price discovery and stability: let applicants pay in native cryptocurrencies or stablecoins that are interoperable with the TCR and sufficiently liquid
- Economic attacks on and by curators: bake identity into the system, such that curators put not just money, but also reputation, at stake
- Low voter turnout: ensure initial distribution is of high quality, use a vote delegation mechanism, and let votes happen on a regular schedule
- Subjecting Schelling Point: reward all voters, instead of just those who are in the majority bloc or let a central entity curate the registry for the few months or years, and later decentralize themselves over time to set the culture